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Best Interests, the Power of the Medical Profession, 
and the Power of the Judiciary* 
 
Abstract 
This paper is a response to a paper by John Coggon ‘Best Interests, Public 
Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession'. It argues that certain 
legal judgements in relation to best interests seek to change and curtail the 
role of the medical profession in this arena while simultaneously extending 
the jurisdiction of the courts. It also argues that we must guard against 
replacing one professional standard, that of the medical profession, with 
another, that of the judiciary in this area. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-008-0085-9  
 
Introduction 
In this paper I give a short response to a particular issue raised by John 
Coggon’s paper ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the 
Medical Profession’. While he was concerned with best interests and the 
power of the medical profession, I briefly raise some concerns about the 
power of the judiciary in this area. Traditionally, the standard for decision-
making in the health care arena with regard to the incapacitated patient has 
been that of the medical professional. Jonathan Montgomery has 
highlighted the fact that in the past “legal scholars have attacked the 
reluctance of legislators and the judiciary to wrestle from the grip of doctors 
the authority to determine ethical issues”.[9, p.185] I argue that this 
reluctance is no longer present. Certain judgements in relation to best 
interests seek to change and curtail the role of the medical profession in this 
arena while simultaneously extending the jurisdiction of the courts. In 
relation to decision-making which uses the best interests standard, Coggon 
asks what we are to do “to prevent despotic value depositing, or even 
simple officious moralism, by medical professionals”.[5, p.000] A brief 
look at the development of best interests in English law leads me, in this 
paper, to ask what we are to do to prevent the ‘despotic value depositing’ or 
the ‘officious moralism’ of the judiciary. Coggon argues that the best 
interests standard entreats medical professionals to think carefully before 
acting, I argue that it entreats us all to do this, including the judiciary.  
 
Best Interests: A Professional Standard 
‘Best interests’ was established as the standard for medical treatment 
involving the incapacitated patient in Re: F.[11] Here Lord Brandon’s 
judgement echoed that of Wood J in T v T.[14] In the latter Wood J 
declared:[14 at 625] 
. . . where the patient is suffering from such mental abnormality 
as never to be able to give such consent, a medical practitioner 
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is justified in taking such steps as good medical practice 
‘demands’. 
While in the former Lord Brandon determined that it would be lawful to 
administer treatment to an incapacitated adult “provided that the operation 
or other treatment concerned is in the best interests of the patient”.[6 at 551] 
These early judgements essentially employ the professional medical 
standard as the one for deciding on best interests. Little direction is given 
for the consideration of the wider aspects of the patient’s welfare nor for the 
consultation by the healthcare team of any other parties save from Lord 
Goff who said that “it must surely be good practice to consult relatives and 
others who are concerned with the care of the patient”.[6 at 567] Effectively 
these judgements applied the Bolam[1] test in the determination of best 
interests. As Margaret Brazier has commented, the effect of this was that 
the medical profession acted as the patient’s proxy. [2, p.100]1 The concern 
with this approach as Coggon pointed out in his article is that this “might 
permit the doctor to do what he wants, unhindered because of the 
application of the notoriously troublesome Bolam test and an excessively 
deferential judiciary”.[5] 
However, the deference of the judiciary to the medical profession has 
been somewhat tempered in more recent cases with a move away from 
Bolam and ‘best interests’ as the professional medical standard. The cases 
of Re A[10]and Re S[12] saw the Court assert that the assessment of a 
patient’s best interests should be separate from the physician’s duty of 
‘reasonable care’. In Re A Butler-Sloss echoed her judgement in Re MB[13 
at 555] stating that “best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all 
other welfare issues”.[10 at 200] Following that in Re S Thorpe J 
maintained that while: 
 [T]he Bolam test is relevant to the judgement of the adult 
patient’s best interests. . . regard to the patient's welfare [i]s the 
paramount consideration. That embraces issues far wider than 
the medical.[12 at 30] 
In the past Brazier has called best interests ‘a pious fiction’.[3, p.138] This 
is because she doubted whether it is “ever possible to divorce the interests 
of the individual entirely from the interests of the carer”.[3, p109] As such 
the decisions that are made regarding incapacitated individuals cannot be 
made in isolation from the interests of other people in their life. Brazier 
would like us, and the courts, to recognise this fact and to do so openly. 
Arguably this has been achieved in these recent developments in the case 
law surrounding best interests. In these ‘best interests’ seems to be 
constructed in a manner which focuses on the patient and their interests, 
needs and wants. This approach seems to allow room for the interests of the 
people involved in that individual’s care to be taken into account, 
recognising that the interests of the patient and those who care for her are 
“inextricably intertwined”.[3, p.139] This wider concept of best interests is 
                                                 
* The author would like to thank the editors and reviewers for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
1
 This was the practical effect, however, legally this proxy status had no standing.[3, p.130] 
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likely to come closer to what might actually be best for an individual given 
their particular circumstances. 
While the term itself is not actually defined, it is this understanding of 
the function of best interests that has become enshrined in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. The Act binds those making decisions on behalf of the 
incompetent or incapacitated individuals to do so in that individual’s best 
interests.[8, Section 1(5)] In doing so, it requires them to consider the past 
and present wishes and feelings of the person, any beliefs and values, and 
any other factors which may be important.[8, Section 4(6)] Additionally it 
requires them to take into account the views of carers and other persons as 
may be relevant.[8, Section 4(7)] This framework recognises that more 
often than not there is a whole host of people involved in, and affected by, 
the care of the incapacitated. Recognition of this allows decisions about an 
individual’s best interests to be placed in the appropriate context. 
While there are undoubtedly criticisms that could be made of the 
2005 Act, we must also acknowledge the strides forward that it has made. It 
puts the patient themselves centre stage, while simultaneously recognising 
the difficulties and conflicts that decision-makers might face. The 
provisions of the Act, in particular section 4, in my view make significant 
headway towards requiring medical professionals to give due and proper 
consideration to what course of action might actually be in the best interests 
of a particular patient. Doing this will necessarily involve consultation with, 
and regard for, other people involved in the care of the patient. This ensures 
that decisions that are made in the relevant context and are practically 
tenable. 
 
Whose Professional Standard? 
While the developments that these judgements and the provisions of the 
2005 Act are to be welcomed they have been accompanied by some more 
worrying ones as well. In particular, alongside the refinement of the best 
interest standard in the Re A and Re S judgements, there seems to be a 
change in opinion amongst the judiciary about who is best suited to take 
decisions regarding the best interests of patients. The judgements in these 
cases suggest that the judiciary is no longer happy to let the medical 
professional standard dictate play with regard to best interests. It seems that 
they are seeking to redefine the role of the medical professional in the 
decision-making process, deeming them no longer suitable as decision-
makers in cases involving best interests considerations. This is worrying 
because they seem merely to be substituting one professional standard for 
that of another: their own. There appears to be an attempt by the judiciary 
to broaden the categories of decisions that come within the jurisdiction of 
the courts. 
This change is evident if we look at the declarations of the judges in 
Re A and Re S. In Re A Butler-Sloss says that: 
[I]t is the judge, not the doctor, who makes the decision that it 
is in the best interests of the patient that the operation be 
performed.[10 at 200] 
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She confirms this again in Re S saying: 
In these difficult cases where the medical profession seeks a 
declaration as to the lawfulness of the proposed treatment, the 
judge, not the doctor, has the duty to decide whether such 
treatment is in the best interests of the patient.[12 at 27]  
Later she added: 
The Bolam test was, in my view, irrelevant to the judicial 
decision, once the judge was satisfied that the range of options 
was within the range of acceptable opinion among competent 
and responsible practitioners.[12 at 28] 
Thorpe LJ followed in a similar vein asserting that the Bolam test, and 
therefore medical opinion, is only relevant to in assessing the proposed 
treatment for the incapacitated individual. He proceeds to say that: 
 . . . the judge must in certain circumstances either exercise the 
choice between alternative treatments or perhaps refuse any 
form of treatment.[12 at 30] 
He goes on to say: 
In my opinion the Bolam case [and here I read medical 
opinion] has no contribution to make to this second and 
determinative stage of the judicial decision.[12 at 30]  
The implication of these judgements is that the role of doctors in 
determining the best course of treatment for incapacitated patients is to 
limit themselves to suggesting a range of reasonable options, and that it is 
for the Courts to decide which of these is in fact ‘best’. If this is what Dame 
Butler-Sloss and Lord Justice Thorpe did in fact mean then it is 
objectionable on two counts.  
Firstly, one has to question how the medical profession is meant to 
interpret the judgements in these cases. Do the judges mean for every 
decision regarding incapacitated patients to be referred to the Courts for a 
judge to decide the best course of action? This is unlikely. Such a dictate 
would be practically untenable, and I am sure that even Lord Justice Thorpe 
and Butler-Sloss P would not like to see every decision involving the 
medical treatment of an incapacitated patient to appear before the Courts for 
them to act as the final arbiters. A more probable reading of the judgements 
would be that it is for the judge to decide amongst the range of options once 
a case ends up at the door of the Court. This, however, leads me to my 
second concern. 
It is unclear to me why the judiciary is better suited to determine the 
best course of treatment for incapacitated patients in these cases. It seems, 
especially given the provisions of the 2005 Act, that medical professionals 
are equally capable of taking into account the range of factors (medical, 
emotional, social) which could have a bearing on the decision. Indeed 
consultation with carers and proper reflection on the circumstances and the 
context in which such decisions are being made are not just good medical 
practice but simply good practice whoever the decision-maker might be. In 
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this respect medical professionals are surely better placed than the Courts to 
make these decisions. Medical professionals will have built a relationship 
with both the patients and the patients’ carers and are, therefore, likely to be 
acutely aware of the context in which the decision needs to be made and the 
factors influencing it. The same cannot be said of the Courts. 
However, despite the declarations in these cases the judgements did 
still accord with medical opinion on the matter. This situation has led 
Montgomery to suggest that: 
Although the cases now tend to emphasise the importance of 
the courts considering the interests of patients rather than 
merely accepting medical opinion, it is hard to find evidence of 
them departing from professional proposals.[9, p.204] 
The suggestion is that the judiciary are less deferential in process only, 
rather than in the decisions that they actually make. He does, however, 
point to signs that this is changing, in particular citing the judgements of 
Justice Munby. Montgomery sees Justice Munby as exemplifying a new 
type of judge who “rejects deference to the health professions, sees 
healthcare as equivalent to other (commercial) enterprises and, therefore, to 
be regulated from outside without any trust in industry values and without 
any special rules for healthcare.”[9, p.206] Montgomery sees this, along 
with other developments, as ‘demoralising’ medicine and medical law.[9, 
p.206] 
Munby’s judgement in the recent case of SA[7] was outlined earlier in 
this issue by Coggon. He was concerned by the broad scope that the 
judgement in the case now appears to give the jurisdiction of the courts in 
relation to vulnerable adults.[5, p.000] The wide definition of ‘vulnerable’ 
given in the case leaves it opens to the Courts to override the decisions of 
those who might be considered competent in medical terms.[7 at 82] 
Coggon points out that this opens us up to the “real danger that the state can 
rob decision-making authority from individuals”.[5, p.000] This in itself is 
worrying but equally concerning is the question of what the role of the 
medical profession is to be in all this. While doctors have recently only had 
to worry about the best interests of their patients in cases where the patient 
themselves did not have the capacity to make their own decisions, the 
implication of Munby’s judgement is that we now might have to take them 
into consideration even where the patient appears to be competent. 
Munby’s judgement harks back to a time in medicine where decisions 
were made in a strongly paternalistic fashion. With such judgements 
decision-making in the medical arena is in danger of a backward regression 
rather than a forward evolution. Whatever worries we might have about the 
bad decision-making of a minority of medical professionals regarding a 
patient’s best interests can only by intensified by the bad decision-making 
and overt moralising of the judiciary. Whereas a bad decision by a 
particular health care professional will only affect his patients, bad 
judgements by the courts legally bind all doctors to make bad decisions. All 
the work that has taken place in order to move away from the value-laden 
‘doctor knows best’ model could potentially be rendered futile if it is 
simply substituted with a ‘judge knows best’ model. 
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Who Knows Best 
Coggon asked in his paper what we are to do “to prevent despotic value 
depositing, or even simple officious moralism, by medical 
professionals”.[5, p.000] Here I ask what we are to do to prevent this in 
both the judiciary as a whole and in the judgements of particular members 
of the judiciary. The key to the good implementation of the best interests 
standard cannot simply be a shifting of power from the medical profession 
to the judiciary. Proceeding from a position of either ‘doctor knows best’ or 
‘judge knows best’ can only lead us back down the path to a narrow 
interpretation of best interests. It is certain that this was not the intention of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
Coggon maintains that what best interests does is ask “medical 
professionals to think”.[5, p.000] This seems like theoretical and practical 
good advice. If we proceed from a position of actively thinking about what 
might be best for the patient, the focus is shifted away from the decision-
maker, be it doctor or judge, and onto the patient. Decision-makers are less 
likely to act in a paternalistic fashion, acting only on their own values and 
knowledge, when trying to determine the best course of action. Doing this 
leaves it open for a wider interpretation of ‘best interests’ to be applied. 
What is best here need not be based in the values of the physician or the 
judiciary but can encompass a wide range of elements all of which will 
have a bearing on the course of action taken. It will necessarily include 
medical considerations regarding the patient but will place them in the 
wider context of family and carers. It is the kind of care of process that 




In striving to implement best interests as a useful construction we must 
guard against simply replacing one professional standard, that of the 
medical profession, with another, that of the judiciary. Neither is in a 
position to make isolated judgements regarding the best interests of the 
incapacitated or incompetent individual. Each should give more than a 
superficial reading to provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the 
stipulations regarding best interests contained therein. It should entreat 
decision-makers, whether medical professionals, legal professionals, or 
otherwise, to think carefully before acting. In doing this it might go 
someway to ensuring that best interests as a standard is not simply the 
despotic value depositing of medical or legal professionals and that it 
becomes more than a ‘pious fiction’. 
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